

Adin:

Around 9:30 on the night of February 26, 1991, Sergeant First Class Anthony Steede was rolling through the Iraqi desert. His M1 Abrams tank had just knocked out multiple Iraqi T-72s and BMPs and he was feeling pretty good.

Angry Staff Officer:

However, his tank was halted by a group of surrendering Iraqis. Annoyed at being slowed down, Steede got on the radio to try to convince his commander to let the follow-on infantry gather up the prisoners instead of him. As he did so, a T-72 from 1,000 meters out put a 125mm round into his tank's most vulnerable part: the turret ring.

Adin:

The force of the explosion threw Steede from his position in the turret onto the exterior of the tank. Jarred, but conscious, Steede jumped back into the smoking turret and dragged his wounded gunner out. His loader had rolled out of the turret and was laying on the ground, bleeding profusely.

Angry Staff Officer:

With his driver, Steede moved the two wounded men away from the tank, concerned that the ammunition would begin to cook off, since the explosion had shot away the blast door that protected the crew from their ammo blowing up. But they needed their aid bag. Which was in the tank.

Adin:

So Steede ran back to get it. While doing so, he attempted to get the tank going again, but it was a lost cause. So, braving the small arms fire that was now concentrating on their position, he ran back to his crew. The fire began to intensify.

Angry Staff Officer:

At that critical moment, another M1 roared up to them; its commander, Sergeant Jeffrey Smith, pointed to the burning hulk of a T-72 only 400 meters away and said: "Damn, Sergeant Steede, I just popped that T-72; that's the one that fired you up."

Adin:

As an ambulance rolled up, Smith suggested to Steede that he should go along with it, since he had been pretty rattled by the explosion. Steede declined, and instead hopped into Smith's tank, demoting him to loader. He was a tanker after all, and needed a tank.

...

Angry Staff Officer:

It was two days into the ground attack of Operation Desert Storm, and Sergeants Steede and Smith didn't know it yet, but they were taking part in one of the last great tank battles of the 20th century: the Battle of 73 Easting.

Adin:

I'm Adin Dobkin.

Angry Staff Officer:

And I'm Angry Staff Officer.

Adin:

And this, is War Stories.

Angry Staff Officer:

73 Easting, the Battle of Medina Ridge, and the Battle of Norfolk. Since the time they occurred, some 25 or so years ago, the U.S. Army has yet to once again clash against multiple armored divisions, with thousands of tanks destroyed.

Adin:

Armored warfare began in the front end of the 20th century and reached its zenith at the back end of that same century. So we're probably at a good point to take a tactical pause and look back over the landscape that we've crossed in these past episodes from the early days of World War I.

Angry Staff Officer:

Ah yes, it seems like only yesterday that we were talking about then-Captain George Patton-

Adin:

-You just had to mention that name even in our penultimate episode of the season...

Angry Staff Officer:

Indeed I did. Now if you'll let me continue, it seems like just yesterday that we were talking about season one's favorite historical character and how he started from less than square one when building up the American Expeditionary Forces light tank school. I mean, they barely had a way to communicate in an individual tank, much less between tanks at that point.

...

Adin:

Right, and while they eventually figured out the basic things you needed to cover in a platform that wouldn't be destroyed of its own accord, we still saw that even some 50 years on, new challenges were sprouting up to face these armored creatures. But before we talk about that, let's first take on how, if at all, the actual role of tanks had changed over these years.

Angry Staff Officer:

So I suppose there are probably at least a couple threads on which to draw here. To start, it seems as though every country came into the advent of armored warfare with their own slightly different views of what the role of armor actually was, or at least should be.

Adin:

And even whether it should exist in some instances. A number of countries' armor forces went through periods of stagnation where it didn't look like they might survive if suddenly called upon in wartime. The United States being just one example of this before the Louisiana Maneuvers of the early 1940s convinced higher-ups of its essential nature.

Angry Staff Officer:

Right, and once we got past that the key question could be described as, "what's the role of armor in relation to infantry?"

Should they act as support vehicles? Just a way to breach lines for infantry? Should they be an entirely separate force? Each country confronted this question in their own way, but at the end of seventy-some odd years, one thing was clear. Tanks now occupied a vital role in the battlefield and indeed were necessary for victory, especially when used in combined arms operations.

Adin:

So since we last talked — when we were discussing the 1973 War of Israel and the Arab states — armored warfare had progressed still further. There were a few metaphorical bumps in the historical road.

the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq War saw quite a few tank battles, but nothing that really changed the mold of how tanks fought each other. The largest tank battle of this war was Operation Nasr in January of 1981 when three Iraqi armored brigades ambushed an Iranian armored division from three sides.

...

In five days of fighting in the mud, the Iraqis inflicted losses of over 240 tanks on the Iranians, losing only a handful of tanks themselves. But it was, frankly, amateur tank warfare. The Iraqis had dug in and used their tanks as armored artillery, and so weren't prepared to counterattack. Neither side maneuvered in the way that the Israelis had during the 1973 War. And so while the battle was an Iraqi victory, it was not the decisive one needed to knock Iran out completely. The war would drag on another 7 years, at the cost of over half a million lives.

Angry Staff Officer:

The two big technological creations in the realm of armored warfare during this timeframe were the Soviet T-72 and the US M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank. The T-72 was the latest in that long-line of Soviet tinkering and redesigning that began with the Christie chassis way back in the Stalin days.

Originally designated the T-64, the tank morphed so much during production, pushing the timeline into the 1970s, that it was given a new series name altogether. It became the second most distributed tank in the world, just behind the T-55.

Iraq even made its own special knock-off, made from Polish kits. They gave it better armor, treads, improved sights, and called it the "Lion of Babylon." With its 125mm gun with a range of 1800-2000 meters and new optics, it presented a definite threat to NATO countries.

Adin:

Well, it would have, if it weren't for the M1 Abrams.

Angry Staff Officer:

Yeah, it's kind of hard to explain just how, well, advanced the M1 was for its time. Even now, its same essential platform is used by countries around the globe, including the US, although with a lot of modifications.

It was first fielded in 1980, replacing the M-60 as the US main battle tank. The first prototype for the M1 was basically a more expensive version of the M-60. Congress scrapped it in 1971 and gave the money to the Abrams prototype — featuring its familiar silhouette and a 105mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun. Beginning in the 1980s, the Abrams were armed with Rheinmetall-made 120mm main guns, given improved armor, fire suppression systems, night vision systems, thermal imaging for range finding, and better protection from nuclear, chemical, and biological attack.

...

Adin:

The tank was designed to dominate the T-72 in every way, because US planners could not count on having supremacy in numbers when fighting it out with the expected Soviet armored divisions.

Simply put, this thing was designed to outfight adversaries in all weather conditions. Tankers could fight nearly better at night than they could in the daytime. And with improved sights and main guns, they could hit targets out past 2,500 meters — outranging Soviet armor.

Angry Staff Officer:

The M1 was also better at surviving than its predecessors. The ammo compartment was separated from the crew compartment so that if the ammo was hit, that whole section would just blow off, preventing the crew from going up in the blaze of cooked off ammo.

And this is still saving lives - you can see Iraqi tanks even now that get hit with an anti tank guided missile that cooks off the ammo, well, it looks like there should be no survivors. But with the separation, the crew are able to survive the blast.

Adin:

Another benefit to the US way of war was the addition of the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, a.k.a. not a tank.

Angry Staff Officer:

Reigniting our favorite, or least favorite, Twitter battle of all time.

Adin:

I can't help it, the truth deserves to be told. The Bradley was designed to be speedy so that it could keep up with the Abrams and bring infantry directly into the fight. As we saw in the last episode, armor operating on its own was quickly made a smouldering wreck by infantry armed with anti-tank guided missiles at this point in history.

Angry Staff Officer:

The Bradley was also armed with a 25mm Bushmaster main cannon, which could get decent armor penetration on other armored personnel carriers or light tanks. As important, if not even more so, most Brads carried TOW missiles — or, if you want the full term, Tube-Launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missiles. It was the latest in a long line of ATGMs, and with an operational range out to more than 3,500 meters and the ability to penetrate 900mm of armor, it could be ferociously deadly to enemy tanks.

...

Adin:

How deadly? Well, let's look at it this way: more Iraqi tanks were killed in Desert Storm by TOW missiles than were destroyed by M1 Abrams. Looking at it another way, the first main gun on a tank, the French 37mm, had a maximum effective range of 1,200 meters. The TOW could strike out past three times this. It could be mounted on tanks, Bradleys, Humvees, attack helicopters, or fired from a tripod by infantry. If it had a clear line of sight to a target, a TOW could be nearly guaranteed to make a kill.

Angry Staff Officer:

And this capability was not an accident; US planners wanted to be able to mass all their firepower on every available weapons system to be able to annihilate an enemy before it could inflict severe damage. Infantry was integrated into armor formations, covered by artillery batteries — many of them self-propelled to keep up - which could fire preparatory or interdiction barrages, supported by attack and observation helicopters — and over all of it, a canopy of supporting combat aircraft.

Including the A-10 Warthog.

Adin:

The A-10 is like the Patton of airplanes — it always comes up.

Angry Staff Officer:

Well yeah, and because it was pretty much designed to be a flying tank killer, planners figured the best way to do that was pretty much create a flying tank. Heavy, clunky, loud, and incredibly effective. Desert Storm showed the A-10's lethality as it gutted lines of Iraqi armored vehicles with its depleted uranium rounds.

Adin:

But we're getting ahead of ourselves here.

So, the conflict itself, the Gulf War or Desert Storm as it's become known, took off following the invasion of Kuwait by the Iraqi Army in August of 1990. Though the international community was quick to use the non-military tools available to it, namely economic sanctions, then U.S. president at the time, George H.W. Bush, stepped things up with the deployment of U.S. troops to the neighboring Saudi Arabia.

Within the beginning weeks of the following year, the largest military alliance since World War II had begun an aerial bombing campaign against Iraq — ultimately unleashing 88,500 tons of bombs and guided munitions. The largest of its kind ever seen. For context, the over 2,200 Coalition aircraft dropped about as many munitions as the Allies did in the 60 day run-up to D-Day with over 3,000 aircraft.

...

Angry Staff Officer:

Confronting the Coalition was a dug-in Iraqi Army which had built up an intricate line of defense along its border with Kuwait. Bunkers, tank fighting positions, deep trenches for infantry, minefields, berms, and anti-tank ditches stretched for miles as Saddam Hussein prepared for “The Mother of all Battles.” These defenses were replicated to a lesser degree in occupied Kuwait. It was an imposing defense.

And really, it’s kind of interesting to see how even with the evolution of warfare since World War I, by 1990 we’re back to a very “Western Front” type of defense. Dug-in enemies staring at each other across no-man’s land.

Adin:

Yeah, and it was this kind of defense that had caused the Army to re-evaluate the way it conducted offensive actions. Gone were the human waves of 1918. Now, the Army conducted what’s called combined arms breaching, a complex and dangerous exercise that involved engineers, armor, infantry, artillery, and aviation, with the overall goal to punch multiple holes in the enemy’s defenses at points of penetration, bringing an awesome amount of firepower to bear.

It was designed to break the kind of defenses that the US found themselves up against when looking at the Saddam Hussein Line. For weeks, US forces had built up their strength behind the massive berm that separated them from “no man’s land,” waiting patiently for the go word.

Angry Staff Officer:

Troops were jittery, as they had heard reports of Iraqi SCUD missiles targeting installations in Saudi Arabia. But other than being on the lookout for these, and watching Coalition jets fly over, things were pretty dull.

But that changed pretty quickly on the 24th of February when commanding US General Stormin Norman Schwarzkopf sensed an imminent breakdown by his Iraqi adversaries, and ordered the 1st Infantry Division, the ol’ “Big Red One,” to move up its assault timeline.

Adin:

At 1430, four US artillery brigades, two division artillery groups, and ten MLRS batteries compressed three hours of preparatory fire down into thirty minutes. 11,000 rounds of artillery, 414 MLRS rockets — dispensing more than 600,000 explosive bomblets — pummeled a 20 kilometer by 40 kilometer area, completely wiping out all the Iraqi artillery capabilities and causing Iraqi morale to crumble.

...

This was followed up by 241 Abrams tanks and over 100 Bradleys assaulting forward across a 6 kilometer front. The lead tanks were equipped with mine plows and rollers, and were accompanied by Armored Combat Earthmovers, or ACE for short. Under cover fire from friendly tanks and artillery, and obscured by smoke, tanks with mine plows would open up lane through the obstacle, followed by tanks with mine rollers to proof the lane. ACEs plowed over anti-tank ditches to allow the armor to move forward. Once the breach was made, the assault force flowed through and enveloped the enemy from the rear.

Angry Staff Officer:

Initial expectations among US planners were 40% casualties for the infantry conducting trench clearing operations. But so effective was the armored breach that the infantry didn't even have to dismount. In what was supposed to take 16 hours, the 1st ID completed in 2 hours, effectively destroying two Iraqi divisions, and was still ready to keep moving.

Adin:

It was, in essence, what had been planned at Cambrai back in 1917 — hundreds of British tanks rolling forward to break open lanes for the follow-on infantry. At Cambrai, however, tanks were in their infancy; many broke down, got stuck, and those that did break through found that there were not enough follow-on troops to fully exploit the breakthrough. So it was like Cambrai, except this time it worked. It had taken 74 years, but the tank had finally perfected the task for which it had been created.

Angry Staff Officer:

But even with all the technology in the world, war was still a messy business. And in the darkness, dust, and swirling sand of 26 February, First Lieutenant Marty Leners and the armor of Task Force 3-5 Cav were about to discover just how messy it could get.

3-5 Cav was spearheading the 1st Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, which was hugging the 1st ID's left flank as they cut further into Iraq, and in the limited visibility they had run right into a complex of Iraqi bunkers and dug in T-72s, all now within 1,000 meters.

Leners' sergeant was the one who spotted the T-72 closest to them — and the Iraqi sighted them at the same time. Both tanks turrets began slowly turning towards each other as Leners was shouting orders to his tank crew to get the range on the T-72.

Sergeant Wilson was trying to use the laser range finder to ping the T-72's location, but the dust in the air made it impossible. So Leners frantically started manually adjusting the range toggle, desperately trying to outpace the enemy tank.

...

Adin:

His first shot was away before the T-72's — but it was short, ricocheting off his adversaries hull armor. The loader slammed in another sabot round - a round specially designed to penetrate layers of armor, Leners adjusted the range again, and the next shot was away. This time the round was right on target and Sergeant Wilson's thermal sights whited out with the explosion of the T-72. It had only taken three seconds between the first and second shots. Technology was still second to training.

The Coalition ground forces pushed into Iraq in a series of pincer movements moving north and east. As the 1st ID, 1st Cav, 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions, and 1st UK Armored Division pushed steadily northwards, the 24th Infantry Division and 82nd Airborne cut rapidly north and then east to cut off the Iraqis line of retreat to Baghdad.

Angry Staff Officer:

Rather than fighting it out at every single strongpoint, the rumbling armored units — usually screened by cav scouts — bypassed many of these positions and then either encircled them from behind, or left them for follow-on forces.

Their main targets were command and control sites, logistics dumps, and lines of communication — all in an effort to destroy the Iraqi's will to continue the fight. Anything that hadn't already been knocked out during the air campaign that preceded the invasion was left a smoldering wreck in the wake of the advancing tanks.

Adin:

And we should mention — this advance was supported by an unprecedented logistics effort. Supply units endeavored to keep up with the armor, but would often have to catch up during the night when the tanks paused for a few hours.

Then it became a period of frenetic activity as the tanks were refueled and rearmed, crews grabbed extra rations, and then they were on the go again. Mobile logistics activity was really what made the rapid armored advances possible. Support drives maneuver.

Angry Staff Officer:

And this is really the fruition of several concepts we've already discussed this season. One was Patton's idea of mobile warfare; cutting into the enemy's defenses, moving rapidly, and striking where the enemy least expected it.

Back during the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, Patton led his own armor on an end-run through the "enemy" army's defenses to show that it could be done. He even paid out of pocket for his vehicles to fuel up at gas stations along the way. He ended up capturing a key enemy command post and throwing his opponent into complete confusion.

...

Adin:

Yeah, and with the destruction of Iraqi command and communication nodes, information on the battlefield was slow to get back to Baghdad — so Saddam Hussein essentially lost control of it and was operating in a vacuum. It was a Pattonesque dream come true.

I'd be disappointed in our lack of originality in once again bringing him up if it wasn't just so damn perfect.

Angry Staff Officer:

The other concept at work was the Soviet idea of “deep battle” that we talked about back in our Spanish Civil War episode. This involved deep strikes along multiple points of the front to force the enemy to split up his reserves, thus diluting their combat power. Follow-on strike forces would destroy the reserves and carry the battle past the enemy's forward tactical area and deep into their operational positions.

Adin:

Which is exactly what the Coalition forces were doing to their opponents.

Angry Staff Officer:

Now, this isn't to say that resistance was completely gone. Yes, thousands and thousands of Iraqi infantry were surrendering to the M1 Abrams roaring into sight, only to be met by irritated tank commanders who thumbed them rearwards to indicate to them that the follow-on infantry would process their surrender. But there were still Iraqi armored units hanging on. Like the Medina Armored Division of Iraq's vaunted Republican Guard, which was standing in the way of the 350 Abrams tanks of the US 1st Armored Division, “Old Ironsides,” as it was nicknamed.

Adin:

The Iraqi commander was not a tactical dummy — he'd dug his tanks in on the reverse side of a ridge — Medina ridge — so that advancing enemy armor would be silhouetted when they crested the ridge.

But he'd made one fatal mistake — he'd gotten the range wrong. His defensive line was too far from the ridge for his tanks to be able to hit it. But with their longer range, the US tanks could hit him.

...

Angry Staff Officer:

On the morning of 27 February, US tankers from 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored crested Medina Ridge. And couldn't believe what they were seeing through their thermals: hundreds of hot spots spreading out on the valley floor, with each hot spot indicating an enemy vehicle.

In what would later seem like some sort of scripted movie scene, the Abrams opened up at a range of 3,000 meters or more, as Apache attack helicopters hovered as low as 30 meters overhead, unleashing Hellfire missiles. It was target practice.

On the brigade's right flank, Delta Company, 1-35 Armor moved within 800 meters of the Iraqi lines. The lead tank was commanded by Sergeant First Class John Scaglione, who was covering for two of his platoon's tanks that had fallen back to cross-level ammunition.

Adin:

Remember how we talked about that special ethos that Patton imbued his tankers with? Scaglione was about to prove that it hadn't disappeared. See, he believed in being able to see the whole battlefield. So he was standing in the turret with a pair of binoculars, calmly scanning away. Oh yeah, and people were shooting at him. A lot of people.

But Scaglione knew he was the forward-most tank of his unit and that he needed to be able to have full visibility. His intuition paid off when he spotted a T-72 sneaking over a berm and levelling its barrel at the Delta company commander's tank. Dropping into his turret, he slewed the main gun hard left and put his reticule just below the T-72's gun.

His gunner fired and the T-72 was knocked out of commission.

Angry Staff Officer:

Scaglione jumped up again and continued to scan, catching three more T-72s in this fashion, even as mortars and artillery fell around him. He did this until rejoined by his other tanks, and the fight continued.

The battle they were engaged in — later called the Battle of Medina Ridge — was the largest single tank fight of the war — and, some say, the largest in US military history.

And as such, the last big tank fight ever, or at least up to the actual present. But as a battle goes, i.e., a back and forth engagement, it was pretty one-sided. A 10 kilometer line of Abrams and Bradleys blazed away for ten minutes, as US gunners raced each other to see who could knock out more targets. They soon ran out of things to shoot.

...

Nearby, a group of officers from VII Corps, 1st Cav, and 1st Armored were having a discussion about the 1st Cav moving around 1st Armored's northern flank. Corps Commander, General Frederick Franks, was on the ground as well, causing his staff no end of fright when a collection of Iraqi artillery rounds hit nearby.

Adin:

The staff officers asked the 1st Armored's representative if it was friendly artillery firing short. CPT Robinson smiled and said, "Nah, that's Iraqi artillery, don't worry, that's about the fifth barrage they've fired, but they don't move it. It just goes in the same place every time."

US artillery soon joined the fight at Medina Ridge, as did F-16s and A-10s, hitting targets deeper behind enemy lines. To complete the image, thunderclouds gathered and lightning flickered in the background. After two hours, Medina ridge and its environs was devoid of enemy activity. 1st Armored had just destroyed one and a half divisions within about six hours.

Angry Staff Officer:

By 28 February, it was all over. The famed Republican Guard had literally been driven over by VII Corps. The remnants of the Iraqi military retreated northwards and the Coalition did not pursue.

Adin:

It was a limited war with limited goals. Saddam had been pushed out of Kuwait and globally humiliated. As Schwarzkopf put it after the invasion, "Yesterday Iraq had the fourth largest Army in the world. Today they have the second largest Army in Iraq."

Others debate — and will continue to do so — whether the war was necessary, or if it should've gone further.

Angry Staff Officer:

And we'll happily let them take on that discussion

But for our purposes right now, Desert Storm marks the nadir, so to speak, of tank warfare. It was the last time that armored divisions faced off in a conventional shooting war.

Adin:

And that fact leads us down another road. What is the role of armor in the 21st century? One that has thus far been defined by low-intensity conflicts, asymmetric foes, and urban warfare.

...

In short, the wars that have followed desert storm were less well-suited to armor. Tanks have been used in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but for the most part, have, at best, been unnecessarily heavy in terms of firepower and at worst totally ineffective for certain environs.

Angry Staff Officer:

So we've obviously talked earlier in this episode about the ways in which these armored platforms have changed over the near century since they first saw combat on the Western Front of World War I. At that time, they were oftentimes underpowered, both in terms of engines as well as armament, prone to mechanical failures, desperately bad at communications, and more.

Some of those problems plagued them for decades as various countries tried to figure out what exactly was the best type of tank. One that was heavily armed and armored so that it could take out anything it came across? One that was light, required few men, and could quickly charge through lines?

Adin:

As technology progressed, these questions in some ways became less fundamental for tank developers. You could, in a sense, do more with less. Or at least the trade-offs you did have to make were less critical than they once were. Armor became lighter, guns became more powerful, engines became more reliable.

But tanks weren't the only thing changing, so were wars themselves. Yes, the nature of war doesn't change, but its character does.

Angry Staff Officer:

Perhaps we should give a quick overview of what you mean when you say that.

Adin:

Sure, so a nice, quick way to describe the constant nature of war can be found in the writings of H.R. McMaster — who, incidentally, as a company commander in Desert Storm led his tanks to victory at 73 Easting. He says there are ultimately four components that go into our understanding of the nature of war: the existence of both political and human dimensions, of uncertainty, and that war is a contest of wills. While these are constant, the technology, doctrine, tactics, and organizational structures shift — sometimes slowly, other times rapidly. All of these factors go into a character of war that changes over time. Tanks being, at their core, a technological platform, don't float above these currents.

...

Angry Staff Officer:

War since Desert Storm has been categorized by low-intensity conflicts that do not necessarily involve nation-states. Since tanks are expensive and usually require a significant amount of infrastructure and training time to support, they have not played as large a role in these conflicts as they had in the 20th century.

Adin:

Additionally, their use of late has been spotty - Syrian armor has proven incredibly vulnerable to ATGMs, as has Iraqi armor to a lesser extent. Some of this comes down to how they are used - often on their own with no infantry support. Some of it comes down to the nature of the threat.

Angry Staff Officer:

Terrorist use of tanks is sporadic, because they make really, really good targets for Coalition aircraft, as ISIS has learned when trying to show off captured armor. When one of your tactics is to blend in with the local population, well, a tank hardly blends in.

However, there has been significant use of armor in Russia's incursions into Ukraine. Warfare there can best be described as hybrid - a mix of conventional weapons such as artillery batteries and armor, and unconventional guerilla warfare.

Adin:

One might say that since tanks are being used in these conflicts, it serves as an indicator that the day of the tank is not at an end. The recent deployment of a US armored brigade combat team to Poland and Eastern Europe demonstrates that armor still serves as a deterrent.

Angry Staff Officer:

I think that the jury is still out as to the role of the tank in modern war. One thing is sure - if you're going into a conventional conflict, you definitely don't want to be without them

...

And with that closes our penultimate episode of the season. A quick note on behalf of friend of the show, Phil Klay. We've talked a lot about the important role that General Patton played in the development of tanks. We haven't talked about...well...his less desirable characteristics. In short, he was kinda a racist jackass. Someday, if we ever do a biography-based show, we'll give you the picture, both good and bad.

We're super excited about the next one coming your way which will shake things up slightly from what we've been doing these past one, though we'll keep its specific nature a surprise for now. As always, if you enjoy what you've heard, please do leave us a rating and review on iTunes or wherever else you might listen to your podcasts — its how we reach more people's ears who are passionate about storytelling, history, and the changing state of the world.

As always, War Stories is an independent audio show written by Angry Staff Officer and me, Adin Dobkin. I also produce the show.

If you have questions, comments, hate mail, etc. we're always available via social media or our website, warstoriescast.com. You can find us on Twitter and Facebook via [@WarStoriesCast](https://twitter.com/WarStoriesCast) and [War Stories](https://twitter.com/WarStories) respectively. You can find Staffer and I at [@pptsapper](https://twitter.com/pptsapper) and [@AdinDobkin](https://twitter.com/AdinDobkin).

Finally, if you're looking for even more War Stories content, particularly for the upcoming inter-season period, there's one fantastic way of getting it: our Patreon. Patrons of the show get bonus episodes, resource guides and episode transcripts, behind-the-scenes looks at the show, and more for as low as one dollar per month. Once we complete this season, we have a bunch of stuff coming up for our patrons so we promise it'll be worthwhile. You can find us there at patreon.com/warstories.

Until next time, thanks for listening.

...

Primary Sources

[Oral History: Norman Schwarzkopf](#)

[Operation Desert Storm: Ten Years Later](#)

Articles

[Battle of 73 Easting](#)

[The Whirlwind War](#)

[“Lucky War”: Third Army in Desert Storm](#)

[Victory Misunderstood](#)

*Script written by Angry Staff Officer and Adin Dobkin
Design and editing by Adin Dobkin*

...